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Abstract
I set up a potential-outcomes framework to analyze spillover effects using instrumental
variables. I characterize the population compliance types in a setting in which spillovers can
occur on both treatment take-up and outcomes, and provide conditions for identification of
the marginal distribution of these compliance types. I show that intention-to-treat (ITT)
parameters aggregate multiple direct and spillover effects for different compliance types, and
hence do not have a clear link to causally interpretable parameters. Moreover, rescaling ITT
parameters by first-stage estimands generally recovers a weighted combination of average
effects where the sum of weights is larger than one. I then analyze identification of causal
direct and spillover effects under one-sided noncompliance, and propose simple estimators
that are consistent and asymptotically normal under mild conditions. I use the proposed
methods to analyze an experiment on social interactions and voting behavior.
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1 Introduction
An accurate assessment of spillover effects is crucial to understand the costs and benefits of
policies or treatments (Athey and Imbens, 2017; Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018). Previous liter-
ature has shown that appropriately designed randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are a pow-
erful tool to analyze spillovers (Moffit, 2001; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Hudgens and Halloran,
2008; Vazquez-Bare, 2017; Baird et al., 2018). However, RCTs are often subject to imperfect
compliance, which can render actual treatment take-up endogenous even when the treatment
assignment was random. In other cases, researchers may not have access to an RCT, and
instead may need to rely on quasi-experimental variation from a natural experiment (see e.g.
Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Titiunik, 2019).
While instrumental variables (IVs) have been a workhorse for addressing endogeneity
when evaluating policy effects (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996; Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009; Abadie and Cattaneo, 2018), little is known about what an IV can identify in the
presence of spillovers. This paper provides a framework to study causal spillover effects
using instrumental variables in a setting in which spillovers occur between pairs such as
couples, roommates, siblings, etc.
This paper offers three main contributions. First, Section 2 defines causal direct and
spillover effects under two-sided noncompliance and shows that, when treatment take-up is
endogenous, spillover effects can occur in both the treatment take-up and the outcome. I
propose a generalization of the monotonicity assumption (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) that
partitions the population into five compliance types. In addition to the usual always-takers,
compliers and never-takers, units may be social-interaction compliers, who receive the treat-
ment as soon as their peer is assigned to it, and group compliers, who only receive the
treatment when both themselves and their peer are assigned to it. Section 3 provides condi-
tions for identification of the marginal distribution of compliance types, and shows that the
joint distribution is generally not identified.
Second, Section 4 analyzes intention-to-treat (ITT) parameters and shows that these es-
timands conflate multiple direct and indirect effects for different compliance subpopulations,
and hence do not have a clear interpretation in general. Moreover, I show that rescaling the
ITT by the first-stage estimand, which would recover the average effect on compliers in the
absence of spillovers, will generally yield a weighted average of direct and spillover effects
where the sum of the weights exceeds one.
Third, Section 5 shows that, when noncompliance is one-sided, it is possible to identify
the average direct effect on compliers and the average spillover effect on units with compliant
peers, and provides a way to assess the external validity of these parameters. Moreover, I
show that these direct and indirect local average effects can be written as two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimands and can thus be estimated using standard regression methods.
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Section 6 shows that all the parameters of interest can be consistently estimated as nonlinear
combinations of sample means, and are asymptotically normal under standard conditions.
In Section 7, I implement the proposed methods to study the effect of social interactions in
the household on voter turnout. I reanalyze the experiment conducted by Foos and de Rooij
(2017) in which they randomly assign two-voter households to receive telephone calls en-
couraging them to vote on the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner election
in Birmingham, UK. This experiment provides an ideal setting to employ the methods I
propose, as this type of voter mobilization programs are commonly subject to severe non-
compliance (Gerber and Green, 2000; John and Brannan, 2008). I find evidence of large and
statistically significant local average direct and spillover effects, and strong evidence of het-
erogeneity across compliance types. I also show that a simple 2SLS regression that ignores
the presence of spillovers grossly underestimates the effects of the treatment, and I interpret
these estimates in light of my framework.
Finally, Section 8 discusses generalizations of the results to IV conditional-on-observables
and arbitrary group sizes, and Section 9 concludes.
This paper contributes to the literature on causal inference under interference (Rosenbaum,
2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele, 2012; Halloran and Hudgens,
2016; Basse and Feller, 2018; Basse et al., 2019) by considering imperfect compliance. In
earlier work, Sobel (2006) studied the performance of IVs under a completely randomized
experiment with one-sided noncompliance when the SUTVA is violated. More recent studies
include Kang and Imbens (2016), who analyze identification and estimation under person-
alized assignment (i.e. no spillovers on treatment take-up), Kang and Keele (2018) who
provide bounds for average effects on compliers in cluster randomized trials and Imai et al.
(forthcoming) who focus on estimands that average over peers’ assignments in a two-stage
experimental design. My findings add to this literature by introducing a novel set of es-
timands and identification conditions that are independent of the experimental design and
that simultaneously allow for spillovers on outcomes, spillovers on treatment take-up and
multiple compliance types in a superpopulation setting.
This paper is also related to the literature on multiple instruments (Imbens and Angrist,
1994; Mogstad et al., 2019). While most of the literature studies the use of multiple instru-
ments for a single binary instrument, my setting with unrestricted spillovers introduces both
multiple instruments and multiple treatments. In related work, Blackwell (2017) analyzes the
case of two instruments and two treatments under a treatment exclusion restriction assump-
tion that rules out “cross effects” of instruments on treatments. My findings complement
these existing results by allowing for spillover effects on treatments, which generates a novel
set of compliance types and causal effects.
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2 Setup
Consider a random sample of independent and identically distributed households indexed
by g = 1, . . . , G, each with 2 identically-distributed units, so that each unit i in group g
has one peer. This setup has a a wide range of applications in which groups consist of
couples, roommates, siblings, etc (see e.g. Babcock et al., 2015; Fletcher and Marksteiner,
2017; Foos and de Rooij, 2017; Sacerdote, 2001). Spillovers are assumed to occur between
units in the same group, but not between units in different groups.
The goal is to study the effect of a binary treatment on an outcome of interest. The
treatment can be endogenous in the sense that it is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with
the potential outcomes. To address this endogeneity, I will use a binary instrumental variable
that can be considered “as if randomly assigned”, as formalized below.
In this setting, spillovers can occur at two different stages: treatment take-up and out-
comes. The first stage occurs when an individual’s decision to take up treatment depends
on the values of the peers’ instrument. To fix ideas, consider an encouragement design
in which smoking spouses are randomly assigned to a smoking cessation program, as in
Fletcher and Marksteiner (2017). In this setting, it is possible that a person that is not
assigned to the program decides to attend because her spouse is assigned to do so. The
second stage in which spillovers can materialize is the outcome stage. For example, an indi-
vidual who did not attend the smoking cessation program can learn about the health risks
of smoking through their spouse and decide to quit smoking.
Individual treatment status of unit i in group g is denoted byDig, taking values d ∈ {0, 1}.
For each unit i, Djg with j 6= i is the treatment indicator corresponding to unit i’s peer.
For a given realization of the treatment status (Dig,Djg) = (d, d
′), the potential outcome for
unit i in group g is a random variable denoted by Yig(d, d
′). In this setting, we say there
are spillover effects on unit i’s outcome when Yig(d, 1) − Yig(d, 0) 6= 0 for some d = 0, 1.
The observed outcome for unit i in group g is the value of the potential outcome under the
observed treatment realization, given by Yig = Yig(Dig,Djg). The observed outcome can be
written as:
Yig =
∑
d∈{0,1}
∑
d′∈{0,1}
Yig(d, d
′)1(Dig = d)1(Djg = d
′).
Let (Zig, Zjg) be the vector of instruments for unit i and her peer, taking values (z, z
′) ∈
{0, 1}2. Borrowing from the literature on imperfect compliance in RCT’s, I will often refer to
the instruments (Zig, Zjg) as “treatment assignments”. However, all the results in the paper
apply not only to cases in which the researcher has control on the assignment mechanism of
(Zig, Zjg), as in an encouragement design, but also to cases in which the instruments come
from a natural experiment (see e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 2001; Titiunik, 2019).
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The potential treatment status for unit i in group g will be denoted by Dig(z, z
′), and
we say there are spillover effects on unit i’s treatment status if Dig(z, 1) −Dig(z, 0) 6= 0 for
some z = 0, 1. The observed treatment status is Dig(Zig, Zjg). The following assumption im-
poses some restrictions on the relationship between potential outcomes, potential treatment
statuses and the instruments.
Assumption 1 (Existence of instruments)
(a) Exclusion restriction: Yig(d, d
′) is not a function of (z, z′).
(b) Independence: for all i, j 6= i and g, ((Yig(d, d′))(d,d′), (Dig(z, z′))(z,z′)) ⊥ (Zig, Zjg).
Part (a) asserts that the instrument does not have a direct effect on the potential out-
come. Part (b) imposes statistical independence between the treatment assignment and
potential outcomes and treatment statuses, and hence the instrument can be considered “as-
if” randomly assigned. Section 8.1 offers an alternative version of this assumption in which
independence holds after conditioning on a set of observable covariates.
A unit’s compliance type is determined by the vector (Dig(0, 0),Dig(0, 1),Dig(1, 0),Dig(1, 1)),
which indicates the unit’s treatment status for each possible instrument assignment. For ex-
ample, a unit with Dig(z, z
′) = 0 for all (z, z′) always refuses the treatment regardless of her
own and her peer’s assignment. A unit with Dig(z, z
′) = 1 for all (z, z′) always receives the
treatment regardless of her own and peer’s assignment. A unit with Dig(1, 1) = Dig(1, 0) = 1
and Dig(0, 1) = Dig(0, 0) = 0 only receives the treatment when she is assigned to it, regard-
less of her peer’s assignment, and so on. Without further restrictions, there are a total of
16 different compliance types in the population. I will introduce the following monotonicity
assumption to restrict the number of compliance types.
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity) For all i and g,
(a) Dig(1, z
′) ≥ Dig(0, z′) for z′ = 0, 1
(b) Dig(z, 1) ≥ Dig(z, 0) for z = 0, 1,
(c) Dig(1, 0) ≥ Dig(0, 1).
Part (a) states that, for a fixed peer’s assignment z′, being assigned to treatment cannot
push unit i away from treatment. Part (b) states that, for a fixed own assignment z, having
a peer assigned to treatment cannot push unit i away from the treatment. Finally, part (c)
states that if unit i is treated when only her peer is assigned to it (Dig(0, 1) = 1), then she
would also be treated when she is assigned to treatment (Dig(1, 0) = 1), and that if unit i
is not treated when she is the only one assigned to treatment (Dig(1, 0) = 0), she would not
be treated when her peer is the only one assigned to treatment (Dig(0, 1) = 0). In other
words, condition (c) means that the effect of own assignment on treatment take-up cannot
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Table 1: Population types
Dig(1, 1) Dig(1, 0) Dig(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Type
1 1 1 1 Always-taker (AT)
1 1 1 0 Social-interaction complier (SC)
1 1 0 0 Complier (C)
1 0 0 0 Group complier (GC)
0 0 0 0 Never-taker (NT)
be “weaker” than the effect of peer’s assignment. Note that this assumption is not testable,
as one can only observe one out of the four possible potential treatment statuses, and hence
its validity needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Assumption 2 implies the following ordering:
Dig(1, 1) ≥ Dig(1, 0) ≥ Dig(0, 1) ≥ Dig(0, 0),
which reduces the compliance types to five. Table 1 lists the five different compliance types
in the population under Assumption 2. Always-takers (AT) are units who receive treatment
regardless of own and peer treatment assignment. Social-interaction compliers (SC), a term
coined by Duflo and Saez (2003), are units who receive the treatment as soon as someone in
their group (either themselves or their peer) is assigned to it. Compliers (C) are units that
receive the treatment if and only if they are assigned to it. Group compliers (GC) are units
who only receive the treatment when their whole group (i.e. both themselves and their peer)
is assigned to treatment. Finally, never-takers (NT) are never treated regardless of own and
peer’s assignment. The categories in Table 1 are listed in decreasing order of likelihood of
being treated.
In what follows, let ξig denote a random variable indicating unit i’s compliance type,
ξig ∈ {AT,SC,C,GC,NT}. Also, let Cig denote the event that unit i in group g is a complier,
Cig = {ξig = C}, and similarly for ATig = {ξig = AT}, SCig = {ξig = SC} and so on.
Finally, in order to exploit variation in (Zig, Zjg) to identify causal effects, we need to
ensure that the instruments have a non-trivial effect on treatment take-up, usually known as
“instrument relevance”. In this setting, this requirement can be stated as follows.
Assumption 3 (Relevance) P[ATig] + P[NTig] < 1.
Assumption 3 rules out cases in which all units in the population are combinations of
always-takers and never-takers only, which are the cases in which treatment take-up is not
affected by the instruments, that is, Dig(z, z
′) takes on the same value for all combinations
of z and z′. Some identification results will require strengthening this assumption, as will be
made clear in the upcoming sections.
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In what follows, I analyze identification of the distribution of compliance types, intention-
to-treat parameters and local average treatment effects.
3 Distribution of Compliance Types
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the marginal distribution of compliance types in the population
is identified, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 (Distribution of compliance types) Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
P[ATig] = E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
P[SCig] = E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]− E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
P[Cig] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
P[GCig] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
and P[NTig] = 1− P[ATig]− P[SCig]− P[Cig]− P[GCig]. Finally,
P[ATig, ATjg] = E[DigDjg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
P[NTig, NTjg] = E[(1−Dig)(1−Djg)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1].
All the proofs can be found in the supplemental appendix. Notice that the entire joint
distribution of compliance types is not identified without further assumptions. The proof
in the supplemental appendix shows that the possible combinations of (Dig,Djg, Zig, Zjg) in
this setting provide a system of 7 linearly independent equations which identify four marginal
probabilities (where the fifth one is recovered from the restriction that they sum to one),
the two joint probabilities P[ATig, ATjg] and P[NTig, NTjg], and the sum of probabilities
P[ATig, NTjg] + P[ATig, GCjg] + P[SCig, GCjg] + P[SCig, NTjg]
Proposition 1 can be used to test for the presence of average spillover effects on treatment
status. Note that under Assumption 2, E[Dig(0, 1) −Dig(0, 0)] = P[SCig] and E[Dig(1, 1) −
Dig(1, 0)] = P[GCig], and thus testing for the presence of average spillover effects on treatment
status amounts to testing for the presence of social-interaction compliers and group compliers.
Because the instrument is as-if randomly assigned, these issues can be analyzed within the
framework in Vazquez-Bare (2017).
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4 Intention-to-Treat Analysis
Intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis focuses on the variation in Yig generated by the instru-
ment. Imbens and Angrist (1994) showed that, in the absence of spillovers, the ITT estimand
E[Yig|Zig = 1] − E[Yig|Zig = 0] is an attenuated measure of the average treatment effect on
compliers, or local average treatment effect (LATE). Furthermore, the LATE can be easily
recovered by rescaling the ITT parameter by the proportion of compliers, which is identified
under monotonicity and as-if random assignment of the instrument. Importantly, even in
cases where the LATE is not identified (for example, when actual treatment status is not
observed), the ITT parameter still provides valuable information as it measures the effect of
offering the treatment. This section shows that, in the presence of spillovers, the link be-
tween ITT parameters and local average effects is much less clear, as the former will conflate
multiple potentially different effects into a single number that may be hard to interpret in
the presence of effect heterogeneity.
I will focus on the observed conditional means:
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′]
exploiting variation over assignments (z, z′). I will refer to differences in average outcomes
changing own instrument leaving the peer’s instrument fixed as direct ITT parameters:
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = z′]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = z′]
and differences fixing own instrument and varying the peer’s instrument as indirect or
spillover ITT parameters:
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = 0].
Finally, the total ITT is defined as E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = 0].
The following result links the direct ITT estimand to potential outcomes. In what follows,
the notation {Cig, SCig} × {ATjg} refers to the event (Cig ∩ ATjg) ∪ (SCig ∩ATjg), that is,
unit j is an always-taker and unit i can be a complier or a social complier. Similarly,
{Cig, SCig}×{Cjg, GCjg, NTjg} represents all the combinations in which unit i is a complier
or a social complier and unit j is a complier, a group complier or a never-taker, and so on.
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Lemma 1 (Direct ITT effects) Under Assumptions 1-3,
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|{Cig , SCig} × {Cjg, GCjg, NTjg}]
× P[{Cig, SCig} × {Cjg, GCjg, NTjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{Cig , SCig} × {SCjg}]
× P[{Cig, SCig} × {SCjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 1)|{Cig , SCig} × {ATjg}]
× P[{Cig, SCig} × {ATjg}]
+E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{GCig , NTig} × {SCjg}]
× P[{GCig, NTig} × {SCjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0)|ATig , SCjg]
× P[ATig, SCjg].
The corresponding results for the indirect ITT and the total ITT are analogous, and are
presented in Section A of the supplemental appendix to conserve space.
To understand the above result, consider the effect of switching Zig from 0 to 1, while
leaving Zjg fixed at zero. First, if unit i is either a complier or a social complier, switching
Zig from 0 to 1 will change her treatment status Dig from 0 to 1. This case corresponds to
the first three expectations on the right-hand side of Lemma 1. Now, if unit j is a complier,
a group complier or a never taker, her observed treatment status would be Djg = 0. Hence,
in these cases, switching Zig from 0 to 1 while leaving Zjg fixed at zero would let us observe
Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0). This corresponds to the first expectation on the right-hand side of
Lemma 1. On the other hand, if unit j was a social complier, switching Zig from 0 to 1
would push her to get the treatment, and hence in this case we would see Yig(1, 1)−Yig(0, 0).
This case corresponds to the second expectation on the right-hand side of Lemma 1. If
instead unit j was an always-taker, she would be treated in both scenarios, so we would
see Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 1) (third expectation of the above display). Next, suppose unit i was
a group complier or a never-taker. Then, switching Zig from 0 to 1 would not affect her
treatment status, which would be fixed at 0, but it would affect unit j’s treatment status if
she is a social complier. This case is shown in the fourth expectation on the right-hand side
of Lemma 1. Finally, if unit i was an always-taker, her treatment status would be fixed at
1 but her peer’s treatment status would switch from 0 to 1 if unit j was a social complier.
This case is shown in the last expectation on the right-hand side of Lemma 1.
Hence the direct ITT effect is averaging five different treatment effects, Yig(1, 0)−Yig(0, 0),
Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0), Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0), Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0), and Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 1), each
one over different combinations of compliance types. Therefore, Lemma 1 shows that, even
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when fixing the peer’s treatment assignment, the ITT parameter is unable to isolate direct
and indirect effects, which may complicate its interpretation as a causal effect.
Remark 1 (Spillovers and instrument validity) One way to interpret the result in
Lemma 1 is to think of spillovers in treatment take-up as a violation of the exclusion restric-
tion. Since Djg is a function of Zig, the instrument Zig can affect the outcome Yig not only
through the variable it is instrumenting, Dig, but also through another variable Djg. Thus,
spillovers on treatment take-up may render an instrument invalid even when the instrument
would have been valid in the absence of spillovers. This fact shows that identification of
causal parameters based on (Zig, Zjg) will require further assumptions, as discussed in the
next section. 
Two further issues may complicate the interpretation of the estimand in Lemma 1. On
the one hand, the ITT parameter is not a proper weighted average. Specifically, the weights
(given by the probabilities of the compliance types combinations described above) are non-
negative, but their sum is less than one. This happens because the probabilities of the cases in
which units i and j’s treatment status do not change (e.g. when they are both always-takers
or both never-takers) are multiplied by a zero and hence dropped from the sum.
On the other hand, based on the identification results in the absence of spillovers, one may
be inclined to rescale the ITT by the first stage E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]−E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg =
0]. However, this rescaling makes the sum of the weights larger than one. More precisely,
the weights from the direct ITT sum to P[Cig] + P[SCig] + P[SCig, GCjg] + P[SCig, NTjg] +
P[SCig, ATjg], whereas E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] = P[Cig] + P[SCig]
from Proposition 1. As an illustration, consider the (extreme) case in which types are in-
dependent and equally likely, so that P[ξig = ξ, ξjg = ξ
′] = 1/25. In this case the rescaled
weights equal (0.6, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1) which sum to 1.3. On the other hand, if the probabilities of
always-takers, social compliers, compliers, group compliers and never-takers are, respectively,
(0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1), and types are independent, the weights become (0.7, 0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.03)
which sum to 1.13.
Remark 2 (Naive ITT) The naive ITT, that is, the ITT that compares units with Zig = 1
to units with Zig = 0 ignoring the peer’s assignment, can be written as:
E[Yig|Zig = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0] = (E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0])
× P[Zjg = 0|Zig = 1]
+ (E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0])
× P[Zjg = 1|Zig = 1]
− (E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0])
× P[Zjg = 1|Zig = 0]
which equals the direct ITT plus the difference between the total and the indirect ITTs,
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weighted by their corresponding probabilities. This implies that, without further assumptions,
it is not possible to predict whether the presence of spillovers drives the usually employed
naive ITT upward or downward, as this depends on the relative magnitudes of the different
effects that are combined. 
5 Identification Under One-sided Noncompliance
Since failure of point identification of average effects in this setting is due to imperfect com-
pliance, identification of some causal parameters can be achieved by restricting the amount
of noncompliance. In this section I will analyze the case in which noncompliance is one-sided.
One-sided noncompliance refers to the case in which individual deviations from their assigned
treatment, Dig 6= Zig, can only occur in one direction.
In many applications, units who are not assigned to treatment are unable to get the treat-
ment through other channels. For example, consider the experiment analyzed by Foos and de Rooij
(2017) in which individuals in two-voter households are randomly assigned to receive a tele-
phone call encouraging them to vote. In this case, units that are assigned Zig = 1 may fail
to receive the actual phone call (e.g. because they don’t pick up the phone), in which case
Zig = 1 and Dig = 0, but whenever a unit is assigned Zig = 0, this automatically implies
Dig = 0. I formalize this case as follows.
Assumption 4 (One-sided Noncompliance - OSN) For all i and g, Dig(0, z
′) = 0 for
z′ = 0, 1.
Hence, one-sided noncompliance implies the absence of always-takers and social-interaction
compliers, reducing the total number of compliance types from five to three: compliers, group
compliers and never-takers. In other words, units cannot be treated unless they are them-
selves offered the treatment. Moreover, based on Proposition 1, this assumption can be tested
by assessing whether P[ATig] = P[SCig] = 0.
In what follows, all the results focus on identifying the expectation of potential outcomes,
but these results immediately generalize to identification of marginal distributions of potential
outcomes by replacing Yig by 1(Yig ≤ y).
Proposition 2 (Local average potential outcomes under OSN) Under Assumptions
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1-4, the following equalities hold:
E[Yig(0, 0)] = E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
E[Yig(1, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig] = E[YigDig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
E[Yig(0, 1)|Cjg ]P[Cjg] = E[YigDjg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig] = E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig(1−Dig)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]P[Cjg] = E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig(1−Djg)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
E[Yig(0, 0)|NTig , NTjg]P[NTig, NTjg] = E[Yig(1−Dig)(1−Djg)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]
where
P[NTig, NTjg] = E[(1−Dig)(1−Djg)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1].
Combined with Proposition 1, the above result shows which local average potential out-
comes can be identified by exploiting variation in the observed treatment status and assign-
ments (Dig,Djg, Zig, Zjg). This idea was proposed by Imbens and Rubin (1997) in a setting
without spillovers.
Proposition 2 implies that the following treatment effects are also identified.
Corollary 1 (Local average direct and spillover effects under OSN) Under Assump-
tions 1-4, if P[Cig] > 0,
E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ] = E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
and
E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ] = E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] .
In the above result, E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ] represents the average direct effect on
compliers with untreated peers, whereas E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ] is the average effect on
untreated units with compliant peers. See Section 7 for a detailed discussion on these esti-
mands in the context of an empirical application.
In addition to identifying these treatment effects, Proposition 2 can be used to assess,
at least partially, whether average potential outcomes vary across own and peer compliance
types, as the following corollary shows. In what follows, Ccig represents the event in which
unit i is not a complier, that is, Ccig = NTig ∪GCig.
Corollary 2 (Assessing heterogeneity over compliance types) Under 1-4, if 0 <
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P[Cig] < 1,
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ] ={
E[YigDig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0] − E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
}
1
1− E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 0] .
and
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccjg] ={
E[YigDjg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] − E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
}
1
1− E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zig = 1] .
The first term in the above corollary, E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]−E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ], is the difference in
the average baseline outcome Yig(0, 0) between compliers and non-compliers (i.e. group com-
pliers or never-takers), whereas E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccjg ] is the difference in average
baseline potential outcomes among units with compliant and non-compliant peers. These
differences can be used to determine whether average baseline potential outcomes vary with
own and peers’ compliance types, which can help assess the external validity of the local
average effects. More precisely, if these differences are small, the local effects may be con-
sidered informative, at least to some extent, about average effects for the whole population,
whereas finding marked heterogeneity across types would emphasize the local nature of the
parameters in Corollary 1.
Finally, the following result shows that, under one-sided noncompliance, the direct and
indirect local average effects in Corollary 1 are equal to the estimands from a 2SLS regression
using (Zig, Zjg, ZigZjg) as instruments for (Dig,Djg,DigDjg).
Proposition 3 (2SLS) Consider the regression:
Yig = β0 + β1Dig + β2Djg + β3DigDjg + uig, E[uig|Zig, Zjg] = 0
to be estimated by 2SLS using (Zig, Zjg, ZigZjg) as instruments. Under Assumptions 1-3 and
4, if 0 < P[Cig] < 1,
β0 = E[Yig(0, 0)]
β1 = E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]
β2 = E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ].
The coefficient β3 does not have a straightforward interpretation, as it combines several
different effects. Its exact shape is shown in the proof of the proposition in the supplemental
appendix.
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6 Estimation and Inference
Because all the estimands proposed in the previous section are (nonlinear) combinations of cell
averages, the parameters of interest can be estimated using sample counterparts. Inference
on these magnitudes is straightforward based on the normal approximation and the delta
method in a setting in which the number of groups G grows to infinity, and can allow for
an unrestricted correlation structure for both outcomes and treatment assignments between
groups. In particular, the estimands in Proposition 3 can be estimated using standard two-
stage least squares methods.
Because estimation and inference can be conducted using standard procedures in this
context and do not provide any specific challenge, I provide further details in the supplemental
appendix to conserve space.
7 Application: Spillovers in Voting Behavior
In this section I illustrate the results in this paper using data from a randomized experiment
on voter mobilization conducted by Foos and de Rooij (2017). Their study contributes to a
literature analyzing the effect of social interactions on voting behavior (see e.g. Sinclair, 2012).
Broadly, the goal is to assess if political discussions within close social networks such as the
household have an effect on voter turnout, and, if so, in what direction. Foos and de Rooij
(2017) study to what extent intrahousehold mobilization during an election campaign is
conditioned by both the degree of heterogeneity of party preferences within the household
and the partisan intensity of a campaign message.
To this end, the authors conducted a randomized experiment in which two-voter house-
holds in Birmingham, UK were randomly assigned to receive a telephone message encouraging
people to vote on the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) election, held
on November 15, 2012. The telephone message was delivered by the Labour party volun-
teers, and provided information such as the election date and their local polling station, and
encouraged people to vote. The experiment was designed as follows. A sample of 5,190
two-voter households with landline numbers were stratified into three blocks based on their
last recorded party preference (Labor party supporter, rival party supported, unattached)
and randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms:
• High-intensity treatment: the telephone message had a strong partisan tone, explicitly
mentioning the Labour party and policies, taking an antagonistic stance toward the
main rival party.
• Low-intensity treatment: the telephone message avoided statements about party com-
petition and did not mention the candidate’s affiliation nor the rival party.
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• Control: did not receive any form of contact from the campaign.
Finally, within the households assigned to the low- or high-intensity treatment arms, only
one household member was randomly selected to receive the telephone message.
Because the telephone message is delivered by landline, this type of experiments is usually
subject to rather severe rates of nonresponse, since individuals assigned to treatment are likely
to be unavailable, refuse to participate, may have moved or their phone numbers can be
outdated or wrong. For these and other reasons, it is common to find compliance rates below
50 percent (see e.g. Gerber and Green, 2000; John and Brannan, 2008). In the experiment
described here, the response rate among individuals assigned to receive the message is about
45 percent. To account for the potential endogeneity of this type of noncompliance, the
randomized treatment assignment can be used as an instrument for actual treatment receipt.
For illustration purposes, I will pool the low- and high-intensity treatments into a single
combined treatment. To analyze this experiment in the framework set up in previous sections,
for each household g, let (Zig, Zjg) be the randomized treatment assignment for each unit,
where Zig = 1 if individual i is randomly assigned to receive the phone call. Let (Dig,Djg) be
the treatment indicators, where Dig = 1 if individual i actually receives the phone message.
Finally, the outcome of interest Yig, voter turnout, equals 1 if individual i voted in the
election.
In this experiment, noncompliance is one-sided, as units assigned to treatment can fail
to receive the phone call, but units assigned to control will never receive it. Hence, we can
analyze this experiment using the results from Section 5, Proposition 2, Corollaries 1 and 2
and Proposition 3. Since only one member of each treated household was selected to receive
the call, we also have that P[Zig = 1, Zjg = 1] = 0.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. Given the experimental design, the first stage
reduces to estimating E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0] = E[Dig|Zig = 1]. The estimated coefficient
is 0.451, significantly different from zero at the one percent level and with an F -statistic of
1759.03, which suggests a strong instrument.
The right column shows the estimated direct and indirect ITT and LATE parameters.
The results reveal strong evidence of both local average direct and indirect effects. More
precisely, the phone message increases voter turnout on compliers with untreated peers by
about 7 percentage points, and turnout for untreated individuals with treated compliant
peers by about 10 percentage points, both effects significant at the 1 percent level.
The finding that the estimated spillover effect is larger than the direct effect may seem
surprising, as one may intuitively expect indirect effects to be weaker than direct ones.
This comparison, however, must be done with care, as the estimated effects correspond to
different subpopulations. More precisely, the direct effect is estimated for compliers, whereas
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the spillover effect is estimated for units with compliant peers, averaging over own compliance
types. This is different than comparing the direct and spillover effects on, say, the population
of compliers. Note that the indirect LATE is:
E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg] = E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig , Cjg]P[Cig|Cjg]
+ E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Ccig , Cjg]P[Ccig|Cjg]
so it combines the effects on compliers and non-compliers, conditional on them having com-
pliant peers.
Table 3 provides some further insights to interpret these findings. The results estimate
the difference in average baseline potential outcomes Yig(0, 0) between compliers and non-
compliers (first row) and between units with compliant and non-compliant peers (second
row). The differences are about 17 and 19 percentage points, respectively, significant at the
1 percent level. Because the outcome of interest is binary, the fact that compliers start from
a higher baseline leaves a smaller margin for the treatment to increase turnout. For this
reason, we can expect the noncompliers to have larger average effects than compliers, which
could explain the difference between the direct and indirect effects in Table 2.
Regarding the external validity of these local effects, the estimates in Table 3 suggest the
presence of marked heterogeneity in average potential outcomes, both across own and peer’s
type. This casts doubts on the possibility of extrapolating the estimated effects on compliers
for never-takers or group compliers. For these reason, we can expect the identified LATEs to
be different from the average treatment effects, which are not point identified under imperfect
compliance.
Finally, the left panel in Table 2 shows the estimates one would obtain by ignoring the
presence of spillovers, that is, running a 2SLS using Zig as an instrument for Dig without
accounting for peer’s assignment or treatment status. While also statistically significant,
the magnitude of the coefficient is 4 percentage points, almost half of the estimated direct
effect and about 40 percent of the indirect effect. These results can be interpreted using
Proposition 2. Under this treatment assignment mechanism, it can be seen that:
E[Yig|Zig = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0]
E[Dig|Zig = 1] =
E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]− E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]P[Zjg = 1|Zig = 0],
which shows that the 2SLS estimand ignoring spillovers is a difference between the direct
and indirect LATEs, where the indirect LATE is rescaled by the conditional probability of
treatment assignment.
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Table 2: Empirical Results
(1) (2)
coef. p-value coef. p-value
ITT
Zig 0.018 0.045 0.030 0.0076
Zjg 0.046 0.0000
LATE
Dig 0.039 0.044 0.068 0.0073
Djg 0.102 0.0000
Notes: rows 1 and 2 show the estimated coefficients from the reduced-form regressions (ITT parameters) of Yig
on Zig (left panel) and the reduced-form regression of Yig on Zig and Zjg (right panel). Rows 3 and 4 show the
estimated coefficients from a 2SLS regression (LATEs) of Yig on Dig using Zig as an instrument (left panel) and a
2SLS regression of Yig on Dig and Djg using Zig and Zjg as instruments (right panel). The first-stage coefficient
is 0.451, with an F -statistic of 1759.03. Results allow for clustering at the household level. Number of clusters:
G = 4, 930, total sample size N = 9, 860.
Table 3: Assessing heterogeneity over types
coef. p-value
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig] 0.170 0.0000
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccjg] 0.191 0.0000
Notes: estimated heterogeneity measures from Corollary 2. Results allow for clustering at the household level.
Number of clusters: G = 4, 930, total sample size N = 9, 860.
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8 Further Results and Discussions
8.1 Conditional-on-observables IV
I this section I generalize my results to the case in which quasi-random assignment of
(Zig, Zjg) holds after conditioning on observable characteristics, following Abadie (2003).
Let Xg = (X
′
ig,X
′
jg)
′ be a vector of observable characteristics for units i and j in group g.
Assumption 5 (Conditional-on-observables IV)
1. Exclusion restriction: Yig(d, d
′) is not a function of (z, z′),
2. Independence: For all i, j 6= i and g, ((Yig(d, d′))(d,d′), (Dig(z, z′))(z,z′)) ⊥ (Zig, Zjg)|Xg,
3. Monotonicity: P[Dig(1, 1) ≥ Dig(1, 0) ≥ Dig(0, 1) ≥ Dig(0, 0)|Xg ] = 1,
4. P[ATig|Xg] + P[NTig|Xg] < 1,
5. P[Dig(0, z
′) = 0|Xg] = 1 for z′ = 0, 1.
Let pzz′(Xg) = P[Zig = z, Zjg = z
′|Xg]. Then we have the following result.
Proposition 4 (Identification conditional on observables) Under Assumption 5,
P[Cig|Xg] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg]
P[GCig|Xg] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1,Xg]− E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg ]
P[NTig|Xg] = 1− P[GCig|Xg]− P[Cig|Xg]
and for any (integrable) function g(·, ·),
E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)] = E
[
g(Yig,Xg)
(1− Zig)(1 − Zjg)
p00(Xg)
]
E[g(Yig(1, 0),Xg)|Cig]P[Cig] = E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Dig
Zig(1− Zig)
p10(Xg)
]
E[g(Yig(0, 1),Xg)|Cjg]P[Cjg] = E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Djg
(1− Zig)Zig
p01(Xg)
]
E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Cig]P[Cig] = E
[
g(Yig,Xg)
(1− Zig)(1 − Zjg)
p00(Xg)
]
− E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1−Dig)Zig(1− Zjg)
p10(Xg)
]
E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Cjg]P[Cjg] = E
[
g(Yig,Xg)
(1− Zig)(1 − Zjg)
p00(Xg)
]
− E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1−Djg)(1− Zig)Zjg
p01(Xg)
]
,
whenever the required conditional probabilities pzz′(Xg) are positive. Furthermore, these
equalities also hold conditional on Xg.
This result shows identification of functions of potential outcomes and covariates for
compliers and for units with compliant peers. In particular, note that setting g(y, x) = y
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recovers the result from Proposition 2, which gives identification of local direct and spillover
effects, both unconditionally or conditional on Xg. On the other hand, setting g(y, x) = x
shows that it is possible to identify the average characteristics of compliers and units with
compliant peers. Hence, even if compliance type is unobservable, it is possible to characterize
the distribution of observable characteristics for these subgroups (also a point made in the
no-spillovers case by Abadie, 2003; Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
8.2 Arbitrary Group Sizes
Without further assumptions, identification becomes increasingly harder as group size grows.
In particular, the larger the group, the larger the set of compliance types, as units may
respond in different ways to the different possible combinations of own and peers’ treatment
assignments, and it is generally not possible to pin down each unit’s type.
Section A.3 in the supplemental appendix shows that the results from Propositions 1
and 2 still hold with arbitrary group sizes, and it is possible to identify the direct effects on
compliers and indirect effects on units for which a specific neighbor is a complier. However,
a more thorough exploration of what can be identified in general settings is left for future
research.
9 Conclusion
This paper proposes a potential outcomes framework to analyze identification and estimation
of causal spillover effects using instrumental variables. I provide conditions for indentification
of the marginal distribution of compliance types and show that intention-to-treat parameters
identify linear combinations of direct and spillover effects over different subpopulations, but
that are not proper weighted average even after rescaling by the first stage. I then show how
to identify different causally interpretable estimands under one-sided noncompliance, and
apply the proposed methods to study the effect of social interactions on voting behavior.
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Appendices
A Additional Identification Results
A.1 Indirect ITT Effects
The following result characterizes the indirect ITT effect.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-3,
E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|{SCig} × {GCjg, NTjg}]
× P[{SCig} × {GCjg, NTjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{SCig} × {SCjg, Cjg}]
× P[{SCig} × {SCjg, Cjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 1)|SCig , ATjg]
× P[SCig, ATjg]
+E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{Cig , GCig, NTig} × {SCjg, Cjg}]
× P[{Cig, GCig, NTig} × {SCjg, Cjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0)|{ATig} × {SCjg, Cjg}]
× P[{ATig} × {SCjg, Cjg}].
A.2 Total ITT Effects
The following result characterizes the indirect ITT effect.
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Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1-3,
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|{SCig , Cig, GCig} × {NTjg}]
× P[{SCig, Cig, GCig} × {NTjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0)|{ATig} × {SCjg, Cjg, GCjg}]
× P[{ATig} × {SCjg, Cjg, GCjg}]
+E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{NTig}, {SCig, Cjg, GCjg}]
× P[{NTig}, {SCig, Cjg, GCjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 1)|{SCig , Cig, GCig} × {ATjg}]
× P[{SCig, Cig, GCig} × {ATjg}]
+E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|{SCig , Cig, GCig} × {SCjg, Cjg, GCjg}]
× P[{SCig, Cig, GCig} × {SCjg, Cjg, GCjg}].
A.3 Identification with Multiple Units per Group
In this section I generalize the results to the case where each group g has ng + 1 identically-
distributed units, so that each unit in group g has ng neighbors or peers. The vector of
treatment statuses in each group is given by Dg = (D1g, . . . ,Dng+1,g). For each unit i, Dj,ig
is the treatment indicator corresponding to unit i’s j-th neighbor, collected in the vector
D(i)g = (D1,ig,D2,ig, . . . ,Dng ,ig). This vector takes values dg = (d1, d2, . . . , dng ) ∈ Dg ⊆
{0, 1}ng . For a given realization of the treatment status (d,dg), the potential outcome for
unit i in group g is Yig(d,dg) with observed outcome Yig = Yig(Dig,D(i)g). In what follows,
0g and 1g will denote ng-dimensional vectors of zeros and ones, respectively. The observed
outcome can be written as:
Yig =
∑
d∈{0,1}
∑
dg∈Dg
Yig(d,dg)1(Dig = d)1(D(i)g = dg).
Let Z(i)g be the vector of unit i’s peers’ instruments, taking values zg ∈ {0, 1}ng . For
simplicity, I will assume that potential statuses and outcomes satisfy an exchangeability
condition under which the identities of the treated peers do not matter, and thus the variables
depend on the vectors zg and dg, respectively, only through the sum of its elements. See
Vazquez-Bare (2017) for a detailed discussion on this assumption. Under this condition,
we have that Dig(z, zg) = Dig(z, wg) where wg = 1
′
gzg and Yig(d,dg) = Yig(d, sg) where
sg = 1
′
gdg.
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The monotonicity assumption can be adapted to the general case as:
Dig(1, wg) ≥ Dig(1, 0) ≥ Dig(0, ng) ≥ Dig(0, wg)
for all wg = 0, 1, . . . , ng. Under this assumption, we can define five compliance classes. First,
always-takers, AT, are units with Dig(0, 0) = 1 which implies Dig(z, wg) = 1 for all (z, wg).
Next, w∗-social compliers, SC(w∗), are units for whom Dig(1, wg) = 1 for all wg, and for
which there exists a 0 < w∗ < ng such that Dig(0, wg) = 1 for all wg ≥ w∗. Thus, w∗-social
compliers start receiving treatment as soon as w∗ of their peers are assigned to treatment.
Compliers, C, are units with Dig(1, wg) = 1 and Dig(0, wg) = 0 for all wg. Next, w
∗-group
compliers, GC(w∗) have Dig(0, wg) = 0 for all wg and there exists a 0 < w
∗ < ng such that
Dig(1, wg) = 1 for all wg ≥ w∗. That is, w∗-group compliers need to be assigned to treatment
and have at least w∗ peers assigned to treatment to actually receive the treatment. Finally,
never-takers, NT, are units with Dig(z, wg) = 0 for all (z, wg).
Let ξig be a random variable indicating unit i’s compliance type, with
ξig ∈ Ξ = {NT,GC(w∗),C,SC(w∗),AT|w∗ = 1, . . . , ng − 1},
and ξ(i)g the vector collecting ξjg for j 6= i. As before, let the event ATig = {ξig = AT},
Cig = {ξig = C} and similarly for the other compliance types. I will also assume that peers’
types are exchangeable, which means that average potential outcomes depend only on how
many of their peers belong to each compliance class, regardless of their identities.
The following assumption collects the required conditions for the upcoming results.
Assumption 6 (Identification conditions for general ng)
1. Existence of instruments:
(a) Yig(d,dg) is not a function of (z, zg).
(b) For all i, j 6= i and g, ((Yig(d,dg))(d,dg), (Dig(z, zg))z,zg ) ⊥ (Zig,Z(i)g).
2. Exchangeability:
(a) Dig(z, zg) = Dig(z, wg) where wg = 1
′
gzg
(b) Yig(d,dg) = Yig(d, sg) where sg = 1
′
gdg.
3. Monotonicity: for all wg = 0, 1, . . . , ng, Dig(1, wg) ≥ Dig(1, 0) ≥ Dig(0, ng) ≥ Dig(0, wg).
4. Relevance: P[ATig] + P[NTig] < 1.
Let Wig =
∑
j 6=iZjg be the observed number of unit i’ peers assigned to treatment. The
following result discusses identification of the distribution of compliance types.
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Proposition 5 Under Assumption 6,
P[ATig] = E[Dig|Zig = 0,Wig = 0]
P[SCig(w
∗)] = E[Dig|Zig = 0,Wig = w∗]− E[Dig|Zig = 0,Wig = w∗ − 1], 1 < w∗ < ng
P[Cig] = E[Dig|Zig = 1,Wig = 0]− E[Dig|Zig = 0,Wig = ng]
P[GCig(w
∗)] = E[Dig|Zig = 1,Wig = w∗]− E[Dig|Zig = 1,Wig = w∗ − 1], 1 < w∗ < ng
P[NTig] = E[1−Dig|Zig = 1,Wig = ng].
Proposition 6 (Identification under OSN) Suppose that Dig(0, wg) = 0 for all i, g and
wg. Under Assumption 6, for any j 6= i,
E[Yig(0, 0)] = E[Yig|Zig = 0,Wig = 0]
E[Yig(1, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig] = E[YigDig|Zig = 1,Wig = 0]
E[Yig(0, 1)|Cjg ]P[Cjg] = E[YigDjg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Wig = 1]
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig] = E[Yig|Zig = 0,Wig = 0]− E[Yig(1−Dig)|Zig = 1,Wig = 0]
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]P[Cjg] = E[Yig|Zig = 0,Wig = 0]− E[Yig(1−Djg)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Wig = 1]
E[Yig(0, 0)|NTig , NNTig = ng]P[NTig, NNTig = ng] = E

Yig
ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Zig +Wig = ng + 1


where
P[NTig, N
NT
ig = ng] = E

ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Zig +Wig = ng + 1

 .
Notice that this result only identifies the average direct and spillover effects when only
one unit is treated. The reason is that, as soon as there is more than one unit assigned to
treatment, it is not possible to distinguish between compliers and group compliers or between
group compliers and never-takers. I provide this result to show that the conclusions from
Proposition 2 still hold in the general case. I leave the question of what other parameters
can be identified in this more general setting for future research.
B Estimation and Inference
The parameters of interest can be recovered by estimating expectations using sample means.
More precisely, let
1
z
ig =


1(Zig = 0, Zjg = 0)
1(Zig = 1, Zjg = 0)
1(Zig = 0, Zjg = 1)
1(Zig = 1, Zjg = 1)


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and let H(·) be a vector-valued function whose exact shape depends on the parameters to be
estimated, as illustrated below. Then the goal is to estimate:
µ = E
[
1
z
ig
H(Yig,Dig,Djg)⊗ 1zig
]
where the first four elements correspond to the assignment probabilities P[Zig = z, Zjg = z
′]
and the remaining elements corresponds to estimands of the form E[Yig1(Dig = d,Djg =
d′)1(Zig = z, Zjg = z
′)]. The most general choice of H in this setup is the following:
H(Yig,Dig,Djg) =


1(Dig = 0,Djg = 0)
...
1(Dig = 1,Djg = 1)
Yig1(Dig = 0,Djg = 0)
...
Yig1(Dig = 1,Djg = 1)


which is a vector of dimension equal to eight that can be used to estimate all the first-stage
estimands E[1(Dig = d,Djg = d
′)|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] and average outcomes E[Yig1(Dig =
d,Djg = d
′)|Zig = z, Zjg = z′]. In this general case, the total number of equations to be
estimated is 36: four probabilities P[Zig = z, Zjg = z
′] plus the four indicators 1(Zig =
z, Zjg = z
′) times each of the eight elements in H(·). The dimension of H(·) can be reduced,
for example, by focusing on ITT parameters E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′], which corresponds to:
H(Yig,Dig,Djg) = Yig,
or by imposing the assumptions described in previous sections. For instance, under one-sided
noncompliance, the parameters in Corollaries 1 and 2 can be estimated by defining:
1
z
ig =


1(Zig = 0, Zjg = 0)
1(Zig = 1, Zjg = 0)
1(Zig = 0, Zjg = 1)


and
H(Yig,Dig,Djg) =


Dig
Yig
Yig(1−Dig)
Yig(1−Djg)

 .
Regardless of the choice of 1zig and H(·), the dimension of the vector of parameters to be
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estimated is fixed (and at most 36). Consider the following sample mean estimator:
µˆ =
1
G
G∑
g=1
Wg
where
Wg =
[
(1z1g + 1
z
2g)/2
(H(Y1g,D1g,D2g)⊗ 1z1g +H(Y2g,D2g,D1g)⊗ 1z2g)/2
]
.
I will assume the following.
Assumption 7 (Sampling and moments) Let Vig = (Yig,Dig, Zig)
′ for i = 1, 2, and
Vg = (V
′
1g, V
′
2g)
′.
1. (Vg)
G
g=1 are independent and identically distributed.
2. For each g, V1g and V2g are identically distributed but not necessarily independent.
3. E[Y 4ig] <∞.
Assumption 7 requires the groups to be independent and identically distributed, but
allows units within groups to be arbitrarily correlated.
It is straightforward to see that under assumption 7, µˆ is unbiased and consistent for µ,
and it converges in distribution to a normal random variable after centering and rescaling as
G→∞: √
G(µˆ− µ) D→ N (0,Σ)
where Σ = E[(Wg − µ)(Wg − µ)′], and where the limiting variance can be consistently
estimated by:
Σˆ =
1
G
∑
g
(Wg − µˆ)(Wg − µˆ)′.
Finally, once µˆ has been estimated, the treatment effects of interest can be estimated as (pos-
sibly nonlinear) transformations of µˆ, and their variance estimated using the delta method.
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C Proofs of Main Results
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
By assumption 1, E[Dig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = E[Dig(z, z′)]. Thus, under monotonicity (as-
sumption 2),
E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 0] = E[Dig(0, 0)] = P[ATig]
E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 1] = E[Dig(0, 1)] = P[ATig] + P[SCig]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 0] = E[Dig(1, 0)] = P[ATig] + P[SCig] + P[Cig]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 1] = E[Dig(1, 1)] = P[ATig] + P[SCig] + P[Cig] + P[GCig]
and by simply solving the system it follows that
P[ATig] = E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 0]
P[SCig] = E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 1]− E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 0]
P[Cig] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 0]− E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zig = 1]
P[GCig] = E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 1]− E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 0]
and by monotonicity P[NTig] = 1− P[ATig]− P[SCig]− P[Cig]− P[GCig]. Finally,
E[DigDjg|Zig = 0, Zig = 0] = E[Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0)] = P[ATig, ATjg]
E[(1−Dig)(1 −Djg)|Zig = 1, Zig = 1] = E[(1−Dig(1, 1))(1 −Djg(1, 1))] = P[NTig, NTjg].
See Tables 4 and 5 for the whole system of equations. 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Using that:
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)(1−Djg(z′, z))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(1 −Dig(z, z′))Djg(z′, z)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)Djg(z′, z)],
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Table 4: System of equations
Dig Djg Zig Zjg Probabilities
1 1 0 0 pAA
1 1 0 1 pAA + pAS + pAC + pSA + pSS + pSC
1 1 1 0 pAA + pAS + pAC + pSA + pSS + pSC
1 1 1 1 1− pN − pNN
0 0 1 1 pNN
0 0 1 0 pGC + pGG + pGN + pNC + pNG + pNN
0 0 0 1 pGC + pGG + pGN + pNC + pNG + pNN
0 0 0 0 1− pA − pAA
1 0 0 0 pAS + pAC + pAG + pAN
1 0 1 1 pNA + pNS + pNC + pNG
1 0 0 1 pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN
1 0 1 0 pAC + pAG + pAN + pSC + pSG + pSN + pCC + pCG + pCN
0 1 0 0 pAS + pAC + pAG + pAN
0 1 1 1 pNA + pNS + pNC + pNG
0 1 0 1 pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN
0 1 1 0 pAC + pAG + pAN + pSC + pSG + pSN + pCC + pCG + pCN
Table 5: System of equations - simplified
Dig Djg Zig Zjg Probabilities Independent?
1 1 0 0 pAA 1
1 1 0 1 pA + pS − (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) 2
1 1 1 0 pA + pS − (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) -
1 1 1 1 1− pN − pNN 3
0 0 1 1 pNN 4
0 0 1 0 pG + pN − (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) 5
0 0 0 1 pG + pN − (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) -
0 0 0 0 1− pA − pAA 6
1 0 0 0 pA − pAA -
1 0 1 1 pN − pNN -
1 0 0 1 pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN 7
1 0 1 0 pC + (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) -
0 1 0 0 pA − pAA -
0 1 1 1 pN − pNN -
0 1 0 1 pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN -
0 1 1 0 pC + (pAG + pAN + pSG + pSN) -
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Table 6: Dig(1, 0)(1−Djg(0, 1))−Dig(0, 0)(1−Djg(0, 0))
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 -1 AT SC
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 C,SC C,GC,NT
0 0 0 0 0
Table 7: (1−Dig(1, 0))Djg(0, 1)− (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 -1 C,SC AT
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 GC,NT SC
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
we have:
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(1, 0)(1 −Djg(0, 1)) −Dig(0, 0)(1 −Djg(0, 0)))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))((1 −Dig(1, 0))Djg(0, 1) − (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0))]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(1, 0)Djg(0, 1) −Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0))].
Tables 6, 7 and 8 list the possible values that the terms that depend on the potential treatment
statuses can take, which gives the desired result after some algebra. 
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Table 8: Dig(1, 0))Djg(0, 1)−Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 AT SC
1 1 0 1 1 C,SC AT
1 1 0 0 1 C,SC SC
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The result follows using that
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)(1−Djg(z′, z))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(1 −Dig(z, z′))Djg(z′, z)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)Djg(z′, z)],
combined with the facts that under one-sided noncompliance, Dig(0, 1) = Dig(0, 0) = 0, for
all i, Dig(1, 0) = 1 implies that i is a complier and Dig(1, 1) = 0 implies i is a never-taker. 
C.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Combine lines 2 and 5 from the display in Proposition 2 and the results in Proposition 1,
noting that under one-sided noncompliance E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] = 0. 
C.5 Proof of Corollary 2
We have that E[Yig(0, 0)] = E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig] + E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ]P[Ccig] and thus
E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ] =
E[Yig(0, 0)] − E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]P[Cig]
1− P[Cig]
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from which
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ] =
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]− E[Yig(0, 0)]
1− P[Cig] .
Using Proposition 2, we obtain
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccig ] ={
E[YigDig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0] − E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
}
1
1− E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zig = 0] .
Similarly,
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccjg ] =
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]− E[Yig(0, 0)]
1− P[Cjg] .
and thus
E[Yig(0, 0)|Cjg]− E[Yig(0, 0)|Ccjg] ={
E[YigDjg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] − E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
}
1
1− E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zig = 1] .
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Since E[uig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = 0 for all (z, z′) by assumption,
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = β0 + β1E[Dig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′]
+ β2E[Djg|Zig = z, Zjg = z′]
+ β3E[DigDjg|Zig = z, Zjg = z′]
Under one-sided noncompliance, E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = z′] = E[Djg|Zig = z, Zjg = 0] = 0
and thus:
E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] = β0
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0] = β0 + β1E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]
E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] = β0 + β2E[Dig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]
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from which:
β0 = E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
β1 =
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0] = E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]
β2 =
E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0]
E[Djg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1] = E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]
β3 =
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− β0 − β1E[Dig(1, 1)] − β2E[Djg(1, 1)]
E[Djg(1, 1)Djg(1, 1)]
as long as E[Djg(1, 1)Djg(1, 1)] > 0 (otherwise, β3 is not identified). Finally, note that
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
+ E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Dig(1, 1) = 1]E[Dig(1, 1)]
+ E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Djg(1, 1) = 1]E[Djg(1, 1)]
+ E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 1) + Yig(0, 0)|Dig(1, 1) = 1,Djg(1, 1) = 1]
× E[Dig(1, 1)Djg(1, 1)]
and use the fact that Dig(1, 1) = 1 if i is a complier or a group complier to get that:
β3 = (E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|GCig ]− E[Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0)|Cig ]) P[GCig]
E[Dig(1, 1)Djg(1, 1)]
+ (E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|GCjg ]− E[Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0)|Cjg ]) P[GCjg]
E[Dig(1, 1)Djg(1, 1)]
+ E[Yig(1, 1) − Yig(1, 0) − (Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))|Dig(1, 1) = 1,Djg(1, 1) = 1].
which gives the result. 
C.7 Proof of Proposition 4
First,
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg] = E[Dig(1, 0)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg]
= E[Dig(1, 0)|Xg ] = P[Cig|Xg]
and
E[Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1,Xg] = E[Dig(1, 1)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1,Xg ]
= E[Dig(1, 1)|Xg ] = P[Cig|Xg] + P[GCig|Xg].
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For the second part, we have that for the first term,
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)
(1 − Zig)(1− Zjg)
p00(Xg)
]
= EXg
{
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)
(1− Zig)(1 − Zjg)
p00(Xg)
∣∣∣∣Xg
]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig,Xg)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Xg]}
= E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)].
For the second term,
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Dig
Zig(1− Zig)
p10(Xg)
]
= EXg
{
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Dig
Zig(1− Zig)
p10(Xg)
∣∣∣∣Xg
]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig,Xg)Dig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(1, 0),Xg)Dig(1, 0)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(1, 0),Xg)Dig(1, 0)|Xg]}
= E [g(Yig(1, 0),Xg)Dig(1, 0)]
= E [g(Yig(1, 0),Xg)|Cig]P[Cig].
For the third term,
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Djg
(1− Zig)Zig
p01(Xg)
]
= EXg
{
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)Djg
(1− Zig)Zig
p01(Xg)
∣∣∣∣Xg
]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig,Xg)Djg|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 1),Xg)Djg(0, 1)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 1),Xg)Djg(0, 1)]}
= E [g(Yig(0, 1),Xg)Djg(0, 1)]
= E[g(Yig(0, 1),Xg)|Cjg]P[Cjg].
For the fourth term,
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1 −Dig)Zig(1− Zjg)
p10(Xg)
]
= EXg
{
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1 −Dig)Zig(1− Zjg)
p10(Xg)
∣∣∣∣Xg
]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig,Xg)(1−Dig)|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg ]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1−Dig(1, 0))|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0,Xg ]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1−Dig(1, 0))|Xg]}
= E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1−Dig(1, 0))]
= E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Ccig]P[Ccig]
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and the result follows from E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)] = E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Cig]P[Cig]+E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Ccig]P[Ccig].
Similarly for the fifth term,
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1 −Djg)(1 − Zig)Zjg
p01(Xg)
]
= EXg
{
E
[
g(Yig,Xg)(1−Djg)(1− Zig)Zjg
p01(Xg)
∣∣∣∣Xg
]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig,Xg)(1 −Djg)|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1 −Djg(1, 0))|Zig = 0, Zjg = 1,Xg]}
= EXg {E [g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1 −Djg(1, 0))|Xg]}
= E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)(1 −Djg(1, 0))]
= E[g(Yig(0, 0),Xg)|Ccjg]P[Ccjg]
and it can be seen that all these equalities also hold conditional on Xg. 
D Proofs of Additional Results
D.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Using that:
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)(1−Djg(z′, z))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(1 −Dig(z, z′))Djg(z′, z)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)Djg(z′, z)],
we have:
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 0]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(0, 1)(1 −Djg(1, 0)) −Dig(0, 0)(1 −Djg(0, 0)))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))((1 −Dig(0, 1))Djg(1, 0) − (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0))]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(0, 1)Djg(1, 0) −Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0))].
Tables 9, 10 and 11 list the possible values that the terms that depend on the potential
treatment statuses can take, which gives the desired result after some algebra. 
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Table 9: Dig(0, 1)(1−Djg(1, 0))−Dig(0, 0)(1−Djg(0, 0))
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 -1 AT SC,C
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 SC GC,NT
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Table 10: (1−Dig(0, 1))Djg(1, 0)− (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 -1 SC AT
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 C,CG,NT SC,C
0 0 0 0 0
Table 11: Dig(0, 1))Djg(1, 0)−Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 0) Djg(0, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 AT SC,C
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 SC AT
1 1 0 0 1 SC SC,C
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
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Table 12: Dig(1, 1)(1−Djg(1, 1))−Dig(0, 0)(1−Djg(0, 0))
Dig(1, 1) Djg(1, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 -1 AT SC,C,GC
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 -1 SC,C,GC NT
0 0 0 0 0
D.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Using that:
E[Yig|Zig = z, Zjg = z′] = E[Yig(0, 0)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)(1−Djg(z′, z))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(1 −Dig(z, z′))Djg(z′, z)]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))Dig(z, z′)Djg(z′, z)],
we have:
E[Yig|Zig = 1, Zjg = 1]− E[Yig|Zig = 0, Zjg = 0] =
+ E[(Yig(1, 0) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(1, 1)(1 −Djg(1, 1)) −Dig(0, 0)(1 −Djg(0, 0)))]
+ E[(Yig(0, 1) − Yig(0, 0))((1 −Dig(1, 1))Djg(1, 1) − (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0))]
+ E[(Yig(1, 1) − Yig(0, 0))(Dig(1, 1)Djg(1, 1) −Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0))].
Tables 12, 13 and 14 list the possible values that the terms that depend on the potential
treatment statuses can take, which gives the desired result after some algebra. 
D.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is the same as the one for Proposition 1, replacing {Zjg = 0} by {Wig = 0} and
{Zjg = 1} by {Zjg = 1,Wig = w∗}. 
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Table 13: (1−Dig(1, 1))Djg(1, 1)− (1−Dig(0, 0))Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 1) Djg(1, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 -1 SC,C,GC AT
0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 NT SC,C,GC
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Table 14: Dig(1, 1))Djg(1, 1)−Dig(0, 0)Djg(0, 0)
Dig(1, 1) Djg(1, 1) Dig(0, 0) Djg(0, 0) Difference ξig ξjg
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 SC,C,GC AT
1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 AT SC,C,GC
1 1 0 0 1 SC,C,GC SC,C,GC
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
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D.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof is the same as the one for Proposition 2, replacing {Zjg = 0} by {Wig = 0} and
{Zjg = 1} by {Zjg = 1,Wig = 1}. For the last two terms, note that
E

ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Zig +Wig = ng + 1

 = E

ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig(1, ng))


= P
[
∩ng+1i=1 NTig
]
and
E

Yig
ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Zig +Wig = ng + 1

 = E

Yig(0, 0)
ng+1∏
i=1
(1−Dig(1, ng))


= E
[
Yig(0, 0)| ∩ng+1i=1 NTig
]
P
[
∩ng+1i=1 NTig
]
and the result follows. 
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